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Abstract 
The notion of ‘ownership of the firm’ is central to conventional treatments of 
corporate governance, yet there is very little discussion about what this means 
in practice. In this paper we briefly draw attention to some of the debates 
around the notion of ownership in various disciplinary fields, and then recount 
and discuss some of the meanings associated with ownership of the firm that we 
have found in two empirical studies carried out in the UK and Japan. Our aim is 
to illuminate and disturb some of the commonly taken for granted notions of 
what it means to ‘own’ a firm. 
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Introduction 
What motivated us to write this paper was the divergence between 
conceptions of firm ownership in the mainstream corporate 
governance literature, and the understandings and meanings attributed 
to the notion of firm ownership amongst the practitioners with whom 
we were interacting in the course of our empirical fieldwork. 
Furthermore, we found that there was little conceptual or empirical 
work in the economics or organizational literatures that explicitly set 
out to address what it means to ‘own’ a firm. This contrasts strongly 
with a fairly rich literature on the institution of ownership in a variety 
of other disciplinary fields, including philosophy, political theory and 
law. Our aim in this paper therefore is to draw attention briefly to 
some of the some of the debates around the notion of ownership in a 
number of disciplinary fields, and then recount and discuss some of 
the meanings associated with ownership of the firm that we have 
found in two empirical studies carried out in the UK and Japan.  
 
 
The Notion of ‘Ownership’ 
The notion of ‘ownership of the firm’ is central to conventional 
treatments of corporate governance, which is widely seen to be a 
‘problem’ that arises from the separation of firm ownership from its 
control (Shleifer and Vishny 1997, Monks 2001, OECD 1999). 
Although several researchers have attempted to establish the 
ownership rights of different contributors to the corporation, notably 
labour, on the basis of the residual risk that they share in the firm 
(Blair 1995, 1996; Blair and Kochan 2000), the mainstream consensus 
is that shareholders are the de facto owners of corporations, given 
their ownership of the firm’s equities and associated voting rights 
(LaPorta et al 1999). 
 
Berle and Means (1932) are usually credited with popularising the 
notion of shareholders as company owners. They argued that in the 
earliest days of American industrialisation, companies, which were 
organised to deal with major projects such as the construction of 
    1 
railways and canals, tended to be private institutions, and were 
administered by their founders on the basis that they were their own 
private property. However during the second half of the nineteenth 
century in the United States, professional managers established strong 
control within what were becoming large multi-divisional 
corporations, and shareholders, who were granted the benefits of 
limited liability, became increasingly numerous and dispersed, and 
less able to exercise their role as owners of the firm:  
 
The separation of ownership from control produces a condition 
where the interests of owner and ultimate manager may, and 
often do, diverge, and where many of the checks which formerly 
operated to limit the use of power disappear. (Berle and Means 
1932: 6-7) 
 
What many scholars have ignored though, is Berle and Means’ 
suggestion that as a result of the widespread dispersion of 
shareholding, active ownership of the firm had been replaced by a far 
more passive form of ‘ownership’. Consequently, in their view, the 
traditional conception of the corporation as an entity truly owned by 
shareholders had broken down. The effective disintegration of the 
private corporation signalled the arrival of the corporation as a social 
institution:  
 
Neither the claims of ownership nor those of control can stand 
against the paramount interests of the community. [...] It 
remains only for the claims of the community to be put forward 
with clarity and force. Rigid enforcement of property rights as a 
temporary protection against plundering by control would not 
stand in the way of modification of these rights in the interest of 
other groups. When a convincing system of community 
obligations is worked out and is generally accepted, in that 
moment the passive property right of today must yield before 
the larger interests of society. (Berle and Means 1932: 312) 
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Berle and Means proposed that ‘the “control” of the great 
corporations should develop into a purely neutral technocracy, 
balancing a variety of claims by various groups in the community, 
and assigning to each a portion of the income stream on the basis of 
public policy rather than private cupidity’ (p.313).  
 
In two separate papers, however, Berle (1931, 1932) qualified this by 
arguing strongly that in the absence of a well-defined system of 
responsibilities to society, a system of accountability to shareholders 
was vital, or else managers would be unaccountable to anyone: 
 
You cannot abandon emphasis on the view that business 
corporations exist for the sole purpose of making profits for 
their shareholders until such time as you are prepared to offer a 
clear and reasonably enforceable scheme of responsibilities to 
someone else. (Berle 1932: 1365) 
 
It is this argument that appears to have prevailed, serving to muzzle 
further challenges to the notion of shareholders as firm owners up 
until the 1970s.  
 
At this time, however, new economic theories emerged to challenge 
the idea of shareholder ownership of the firm. The publication of 
Alchian and Demsetz’s (1972) seminal paper Production, Information 
Costs and Economic Organisation, followed by Jensen & Meckling’s 
(1976) paper Theory of the Firm: managerial behavior, agency costs 
and ownership structure introduced the idea of the firm as a nexus of 
contracts amongst individual factors of production. Further to this 
neo-classical conceptualisation, new institutional economists also 
developed the idea of firm as contract in a slightly different form. 
This was originally put forward by Coase (1937), but was really only 
developed after the 1970s, in particular by Williamson (1979, 1985). 
The arguments associated with these two schools of thought are well 
rehearsed elsewhere (Milgrom and Roberts 1992), so will not be 
repeated here.  
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In common with the managerialist conception of the firm, 
shareholders are afforded a pre-eminent position in the firm in these 
economic theories. However, where these theories explicitly address 
the issue of property rights in the firm (Demsetz 1967; Hart and 
Moore 1990; Fama 1980), it is made clear that the position of 
shareholders in a company is not based on an idea that they ‘own’ the 
company, but stems from the supposition that they are its residual 
risk-takers (Alchian and Demsetz 1972). Fama (1980) makes the 
point about the irrelevance of firm ownership explicitly: 
 
[...] ownership of capital should not be confused with ownership 
of the firm. Each factor in a firm is owned by somebody. The 
firm is just the set of contracts covering the way inputs are 
joined to create outputs and the way receipts from outputs are 
shared among inputs. In this ‘nexus of contracts’ perspective, 
ownership of the firm is an irrelevant concept. (1980: 290) 
 
The underlying premise here is that the fullest possible expansion and 
disaggregation of property rights in the firm is most likely to result in 
efficient outcomes (which are assumed to be desirable), as all its 
discrete components are thereby able to be claimed and traded 
efficiently. Milgrom and Roberts (1992) neatly summarise this 
viewpoint thus:  
 
The institution of ownership accompanied by secure property 
rights is the most common and effective institution for providing 
people with incentives to create, maintain and improve assets. 
(Milgrom and Roberts 1992: 288) 
 
Such a viewpoint is now rarely challenged within the contemporary 
economics and management literature. This is in spite of criticism 
from other academic disciplines. For example, MacPherson (1978), a 
political theorist, draws attention to the inherent problem in this 
prevailing conceptualisation of property as a bundle of exclusive 
individual rights for liberal democratic theory. He argues that the 
conceptualisation of private property as involving the right to exclude 
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others from the use of or benefit of some thing, is not a necessary 
logical attribute of the institution of property, and moreover conflicts 
with the liberal-democratic ethic of equality of opportunity:  
 
[…] when the liberal property right is written into law as an 
individual right to the exclusive use and disposal of parcels of 
the resources provided by nature and of parcels of the capital 
created by past work on them, and when it is combined with the 
liberal system of market incentives and rights of free contract, it 
leads to and supports a concentration of ownership and a system 
of power relations between individuals and classes which 
negates the ethical goal of free and independent individual 
development. (p.199-200) 
 
MacPherson argues that this is an intractable problem, unless the 
institution of property is broadened from being concerned with the 
seemingly sacred right of the individual to exclude others, to include 
as well the individual right not to be excluded by others from the 
achievements of society as a whole. This can take one or both of two 
forms: an equal right of access to the accumulated means of labour, or 
a right to an income unrelated to work but commensurate with what is 
needed for a full human life.  
 
Most studies of ownership in disciplinary fields other than economics 
also make the point that the term does not express a straightforward 
universal value, but is a socially constructed and socially enforced 
institution that creates and maintains certain relationships between 
people. In other words, the institution of ownership is much more 
complex than simple physical possession in that it is negotiated and 
enforced through social convention, customs and laws, which may 
change over time. Furthermore, the meanings that people attribute to 
ownership may not correspond precisely to this institution, but they 
are informed by and in turn inform the institution.  
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At the risk of over-simplifying, the main disagreements around the 
notion of ownership usually concern firstly what particular array of 
rights people should be allowed to have over ‘things’, which is a 
normative issue (to be more precise, an issue of distributive justice), 
and second to what extent the array of rights is an accurate expression 
of the chosen underlying normative principles (Christman 1994).  
 
There is broad consensus as to what are the main principles upon 
which concepts of distributive justice can be built (Greenberg and 
Cohen 1982; Deutsch 1985; Kellerhals and Lazega 1988). The first 
(and most widely accepted) principle is merit, which argues for 
proportionality of contribution and return. The second principle is 
need, which argues that fundamental needs must be satisfied. The 
third principle is status, which argues that similarity in social identity 
must be associated with similar returns. Arguments about 
appropriate/legitimate forms of ownership result from, for example, 
the fact that these principles may conflict, the criteria used to define 
them are not easy to agree upon, they are difficult to measure, and 
their relative importance may vary according to the nature of the 
‘thing’ to be owned.  
 
For example, merit has historically been seen as the most valid 
principle upon which to base a system of distributive justice, to the 
extent that it often appears to be viewed as a universal (Kellerhals and 
Lazega 1988). However, there is a significant body of research that 
shows that the accent on merit is stronger when actors’ resources are 
high (Alves and Rossi 1978), when the group has instrumental rather 
than expressive aims (Deutsch 1985; Leventhal 1980), and when 
interpersonal relations are abstract rather than immediate (Stake 1983). 
By contrast, when resources are low, aims are expressive and 
relationships immediate, it is likely that need will be viewed as a more 
legitimate principle for distributive justice. Other studies have shown 
that an emphasis on merit is often associated with an assumption that 
the resources to be distributed are reasonably easily quantifiable, such 
as financial assets. However, where the nature of the good at stake is 
different or less easy to measure (for example affective or educative 
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support), need is often accepted as a more legitimate principle for 
distributive justice than merit (Toernblom and Foa 1983; Hochschild 
1981).  
 
Further to disagreements about what particular principles should be 
used to underpin a legitimate system of ownership, there are then 
questions about how these principles are best measured (merit for 
example might be measured by productivity, effort, length of service, 
level of education and so on), and then what particular array of 
ownership rights is an appropriate expression of the principles 
decided upon. Again, a consensus has evolved that ownership is 
constituted of six main attributes (Christman 1994; Becker 1977; 
Reeve 1986; Waldron 1988; Munzer 1990). These are: 
 
 The right to possess, implying exclusive physical control that is 
allowed by the resource, in addition to the right to non-
inteference 
 The right to use, entailing exclusive use and a duty on the part of 
others not to use without permission 
 The right to the capital, implying the power to dispose of and 
transfer title of the resource, which can be sub-divided into the 
right to alienation, consumption and modification 
 The right to manage, which includes the power to contract with 
others concerning control over uses of the resource 
 The right to security, including the right against expropriation, 
which qualifies the previous four attributes 
 The right to the income, that is the increased benefit accruing to 
the resource as a result of trade  
 
In modern societies it is highly unlikely that any individual will be 
able to claim all six of these attributes in relation to a particular 
resource – freehold land, for example, is still taxed, subject to 
planning restrictions and regulated in a number of different ways. 
Consequently, even though we may commonly refer to the ‘owner’ of 
a resource, in practice this implies a limited range of rights in respect 
of the particular resource or good ‘owned’. Exactly which rights, and 
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in what proportion, constitutes one of the principle objects of debate 
about the institution of ownership. 
 
The brief review presented thus far suggests that the notion of firm 
ownership is far more complex than that usually portrayed in the 
corporate governance literature, where the firm is generally assumed 
to be the inalienable property of its shareholders. In what follows, we 
want to report two qualitative empirical studies that throw some 
preliminary light on what ownership of the firm means to people 
actively involved with companies on a day-to-day basis.  
 
M&E Denton 
M&E Denton (the name has been changed to preserve anonymity) is a 
UK manufacturer, founded early in the 19
th century, which has 
continued up to the present day as a privately owned company in 
which family members retain a 70% stake. The family is now in its 
sixth and seventh generation and numbers about 500 individuals. The 
occasion for the research was an emergent problem of ownership and 
control at Denton and its attempted resolution through the creation of 
a family shareholder council. The qualitative research consisted of 
some 17 interviews with members of the new shareholder council and 
five executive and non-executive members of the company board of 
directors.  
 
This nearly two hundred year old company has acted as if it were a 
sort of time capsule in which 19C attitudes to ownership and control 
had been reproduced, at least amongst some sections of the family. 
The case offered what can be imagined as a condensation of the 
history of the corporation and the changing nature of ownership and 
control within this. In the context of this paper we want to use this 
case to illustrate some of the dimensions of this anachronistic view of 
ownership, and then outline the ways in which these were being 
challenged by both commercial and family pressures.  
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Ownership as inheritance 
You see the fundamental thing is these people have their money 
in the business. They are all very wealthy by our standards but 
because of this ethos that you hold the shares to pass on to the 
next generation, and on the whole they have not got diversified 
portfolios, so these are rich people who own a house and a lot of 
shares in Dentons and bugger all else.  
 
The family connection is a source of considerable wealth for family 
members but it has a number of unique dimensions that set it apart 
from a conventional view of corporate ownership. It is wealth 
resulting from the business that bears the family name; it is ownership 
of a specific set of assets rather than some general portfolio of shares. 
The family name and business are mutually defining; ownership in 
this sense is a 'birthright' rather than a choice. To be a Denton owner 
is therefore an intimate part of one's identity - it defines the self and 
one's social location to a high degree.  
 
As a privately owned company there is only an internal market for 
shares but even use of this is constrained by a sense that the shares 
must be passed on; wealth comes to the current generation as an 
inheritance from their parents and this, in turn, is felt to imply an 
obligation that the shares should be held for the next generation. 
Selling the shares has a sense of something like betrayal of one's 
inheritance and a denial of ones identity- the breaking of an intimate 
set of relations. Ownership is transient only in the sense that the 
shares pass through the owner from parents to children, rather than a 
more typical autonomous and rational decision to buy and sell. The 
rights to dividends from the profits of the company carry with them a 
strong sense of responsibility. Several people talked about a sense of 
guilt about a wealth that was not earned. Others spoke of difficult 
decisions in their early adult life about whether to follow parental 
expectations to work in the business or pursue other interests. But 
with or without a managerial career as a complement to ownership, 
the business itself was seen almost entirely in non-pecuniary terms; as 
a paternalistic cultural inheritance that valued the product, and 
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acknowledged responsibilities to similarly long serving employees 
and the communities in which a Denton factory was central. 
 
The business has a soul and its important that it has a soul. It 
gives me self respect I am proud to work for this company as 
simple as that - its unique. 
 
It’s the idea that this business is a good thing and it employs a 
lot of people, it should be producing good goods and it should 
be a model of what a good business should be and that’s what 
we should be doing.  
 
To be a family owner of Denton shares is therefore much more, and 
very different from, being an investor in a general portfolio of equities. 
Here is ownership not as a portfolio but as a share in a very specific 
set of assets as much human and cultural as physical and financial, 
which carries with it a felt sense of obligation to one's parents and 
grandparents, to the company and its employees and the communities 
in which it operates, and to future generations for the husbanding of 
resources over which one has but transitory control.  
 
This isn’t really my money I’m the custodian of it. It’s a notion 
of stewardship, custodianship. It’s terribly meaningful. 
 
Ownership out of control  
The recent history of Denton as a business had been less than easy. 
The immediate post-war period had seen the company go through a 
period of considerable profitable growth under the autocratic 
leadership of one family member - Adrian Denton. Up until and 
during this period there were still a large number of family members 
working at senior management and board level within the company. 
Ownership was itself concentrated in three main family groupings one 
of which Adrian led. His successful management of the business 
brought him authority within the family who were for the most part 
grateful that the business was in seemingly capable hands. It was only 
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at the end of Adrian's rein that the first tensions began to appear in 
this combination of ownership and control. Here it is only possible to 
outline some of the key ways in which a crisis of ownership and 
control emerged within the family and business.  
 
One source of perceived difficulty came from Adrian's assumption 
that succession should be held within his family group: 
 
He was just very dynastically minded and saw not only his 
eldest son but all three of his sons taking leading roles in the 
business and there was some horse trading that went on 
inevitably. 
 
He appointed his eldest son, Francis, as his successor, whilst with 
various bits of 'horse trading' the other dominant family groupings 
secured other senior jobs for their children. Not only was the business 
maturing and going through major technological and market changes 
but Francis also apparently lacked the business talent of his father. 
The board at that time contained a mixture of family and professional 
managers with no distinction between executive and non-executive 
roles.  
 
Francis was a weak man but supported by his executive – he 
was a bit like King john – you know those barons, provided they 
could run their patch uninterrupted, uncriticised, and unchecked 
they weren’t going to mess up anyone else’s patch. 
 
After ten or so years of business decline the retired patriarchs of the 
dominant family groupings became so alarmed that they forced 
Francis to appoint a professional manager for the first time as chief 
executive. This man immediately confirmed the family's worst fears 
about ceding control to an outsider by sacking three family executive 
directors. There then followed a chaotic decade in which all the worst 
possible outcomes of a destructive combination of ownership and 
control were enacted. 
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With declining profitability, fierce battles began between the various 
dominant family groupings as to the leadership of the business. These 
battles were fought as much in the boardroom as in the family. In this 
respect the dispersion of ownership within the family can itself be 
seen to have become a problem but there was no mechanism whereby 
other family shareholders could protect themselves from the battling 
family executives. The board did eventually appoint a number of non-
executive directors, but they felt that they were listened to by neither 
the managers nor the family executives. 
 
The board didn’t have any mechanisms for consulting 
shareholders and almost didn’t see why it should. 
 
Francis was eventually forced to resign as chairman, although he 
insisted that he remain a director, and was replaced by an outsider 
nominated by another section of the family. In turn, a family member 
replaced the chief executive. What followed was a perception that the 
new chairman and non-family directors exploited family divisions by 
playing one family group off against the other to their own advantage.  
 
I thought it was in the hands of people who had no 
understanding, who had no wish to understand and who were in 
it for themselves.  
 
That the management were writing their own cheques and 
looking after their own interests and saying kind of ‘up yours 
‘ to the family. 
 
After several changes of chairman and chief executive, this negative 
dynamic ended in a non-family chairman seeking to push through the 
sale of Denton to a conglomerate. This shock recommendation had 
the effect of dividing the family between those who wanted to resist 
the sale at any cost, and those who had become so disillusioned by the 
poisoning of family and business relations that sale seemed the 
preferable option. The following two quotes capture the differences of 
view between these two camps.  
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The people I represent no longer felt they had the emotional 
involvement in this. They had a strong view that the company 
was no longer the company they used to love. They had a view 
that the shareholders were impossible, the management were 
impossible so the only thing to do was to sell it. 
 
I would have felt very ashamed if I hadn’t done anything and 
also I felt very angry at that point. If one is brought up with 
something like that - well there are two things. I suppose you 
feel badly - a kind of uncomfortableness about owning 
something for which you do not work, but also a sense that we 
were brought up not to sell your shares, there was a very big 
down on people who sold their bonus issues, and also you are 
not looking at people who have many shares in other things, 
people weren’t speculating, so the whole issue of things like 
share price weren’t very real questions in all of it. 
 
So the implosion of the ability of the family to act as owner managers, 
and their early attempts to achieve at least a partial separation of 
ownership and control had seemed only to polarize the family. On the 
one side were those who felt that the family had to reassert its direct 
control over the company. On the other side were those who felt that 
neither firm nor family were controllable, and who therefore wanted a 
complete divorce from the company through sale.  
 
This version of an emergent problem of ownership and control is 
more complex than a simple dispersion of ownership creating 
effective managerial control. Certainly there is a belief in the minds of 
shareholders that senior professional managers have a different set of 
interests and motivations than those of the family. (In)secure in its 
wealth, the family can fear the unprincipled self interest of these 
individuals and, in particular resent a managerial proposal to sell what 
they did not own. The lack of executive skill in the family, 
nevertheless, creates a necessary dependence on these same managers 
even if this is difficult to acknowledge. However, it cannot all be 
    13 
blamed on the managers for, as the performance of Denton declines, 
there is an emergent tension between the dispersed owners and the 
different factions of owner/managers. Struggles between the 
executive representatives of different family groups apparently 
displaced and was threatening the control of the business; Denton’s 
boardroom became a place were family battles were enacted.  
 
A differentiation and integration of ownership and control 
The struggle between those who wanted to sell and those who wanted 
to reassert direct family control culminated in an Extraordinary 
General Meeting where the sale was rejected by a very narrow margin 
of shareholders. The chairman who had proposed the sale resigned 
and it was left to both the victorious and vanquished members of the 
different family groupings to begin to find a way forward. There had 
been an attempt during the preceding period to establish some sort of 
forum of family shareholders with whom the chairman of the board 
could communicate. This informal grouping had never succeeded 
because significant portions of the family refused to have anything to 
do with it. In the light of the recent crisis the potential for such a 
representative forum of family shareholdings began to be explored 
more seriously. These were then combined with a series of 
recommendations from a consultant for the restructuring of the board 
at Denton. What emerged within a year of the EGM was a new board 
structure in which there were to be four executive directors, a non-
executive chairman and four other non-executives, two of whom were 
to be elected by the newly created shareholders council. This body 
was to have fifteen members, each elected as a representative of 
different shareholding interests.  
 
In place of the either/or formulation of the problem of ownership and 
control – reinvest in direct control or sell - the creation of the 
shareholders council can be seen as way both to differentiate out and 
also integrate ownership and control. The board could now focus on 
the direction and control of the business whilst the shareholder’s 
council could deal with family ownership issues. These related 
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concerns were then re-integrated through meetings between the 
council and board members. At the time of the research the council 
had been in existence for some five years. Here we can only 
document what were widely perceived as the very positive effects of 
this new governance arrangement.  
 
Compared with the previous period where direct family control was 
failing, the council and its relationship with the board has produced 
the paradoxical effect of enhancing shareholder control through a 
retreat from direct control.  
 
Given the coincidence of family and business relationship one of the 
most tangible effects of the council is felt to have been the healing of 
family divisions. The earlier struggles for power within the business 
and fight over the proposed sale of Denton had created considerable 
animosity between different factions of the family. The council’s 
quarterly meetings have gradually healed these earlier wounds. They 
have also had the unanticipated effect of involving the younger 
generations of the family, and allowing distant members of the family 
to renew each other’s acquaintance. Much of the work of the council 
has involved deliberations as to how to deal with the issue of eventual 
flotation which has now been subtly redefined in terms of 
‘marketability’. For the first time, however, the council provides a 
structure through which the interests of dispersed family shareholders 
can be equally represented and reconciled.  
 
The other central preoccupation of the council has been the 
performance of the business. There are regular informal contacts 
between the chairman of the board and council. The company 
chairman also attends and makes a presentation to the quarterly 
council meetings, followed by questions. On occasions, the chief 
executive and finance director also attend council meetings. There is 
now perceived to be a much higher level of information available to 
shareholders, and, given that the council is a single representative 
body, no opportunity for management to play off one section of the 
family against another. For board members there is relief that family 
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struggles no longer take place within the boardroom. More positively, 
the council provides an efficient forum for communication with 
family shareholders, and has given the board greater confidence in its 
own work through giving it an explicit and timely understanding of 
shareholder views in relation to corporate performance and strategy. 
Around a number of potentially contentious issues related to share 
options, bonuses, and appointments the council has proved itself able 
to redirect management proposals. More subtly, the greater clarity and 
trust that the council has created both between family members and 
between the council and board, is seen to have created a context in 
which the new chief executive has been able to address a number of 
long standing strategic and operational issues within the business. 
Although the family no longer has any executive role in the business, 
the routine accountability between the board and council means that 
there is now a more accurate and informed image of shareholder 
interests in the minds of directors, and no doubt that these interests 
have to be taken into account. In particular, the council has become a 
vehicle through which the family values have been able influence a 
number of aspects of business policy. 
Japanese Corporate Owners 
Our second account of meanings associated with ownership of the 
firm, is based on data collected in Japan, where 153 employees and 
directors in 26 different companies, banks and other financial 
institutions were interviewed as part of an exploratory study of 
Japanese corporate governance practices. The sample included some 
of the largest public multinationals, as well as some small, 
entrepreneurial companies that at the time of the research had recently 
been or were in the process of being listed on the Japanese Stock 
Exchanges. Some of the companies were highly profitable, whilst 
others were making losses. Some were ‘global companies’, exporting 
around the world, whilst half of the sample were purely domestic 
concerns. 
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Shareholders as corporate participants, not owners 
At the time of the research between 1998-2000, there was enormous 
turmoil within Japanese industry, associated with an unrelenting 
economic downturn and profound financial reform taking place. In 
addition, international institutional investors were becoming 
increasingly pro-active in the management of their Japanese share 
portfolios, partly as a result of holding larger volumes of Japanese 
shares, and partly as a result of the poor performance of these 
investments. Some of the larger American institutional investors had 
begun to visit companies in which they held shares, introducing 
themselves as corporate owners and expecting to be received, and 
listened to, as such. Consequently, the issue of corporate ownership 
was an important topic of debate in the media and at various business 
association meetings, and was exercising the minds of almost all the 
respondents we interviewed. 
 
Nonetheless within all of the companies we studied, while there was 
often some rhetoric about shareholders owning the company, when 
pressed company employees and directors acknowledged that in 
practice, shareholders were not seen as, or treated as, company 
owners. For example a senior director of a manufacturing company 
explained: 
 
I should be saying 100% to the shareholder but this is a sort of 
formal or legalistic answer. But this does not really reflect my 
sentiment. 
 
One interviewee, responsible for a Japanese Investor Relations’ 
organisation, tried to clarify why shareholders were not seen as 
company owners in Japan: 
 
Well there is no sense of shareholder ownership in Japan, it is 
kyoodootai [a co-operative or collaborative body], the 
corporation involves many kinds of stakeholders, so there are no 
strong owners. Domestic institutional investors do not think of 
themselves as owners. When investors used to meet with 
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companies it was friendly and informal - they called it the 
okabunushikai [the major shareholder meeting], once or twice a 
year, with most of the investors from banks. But not really 
because they were shareholders, well it’s difficult so I can’t 
really explain properly. 
 
What this interviewee found difficult to explain was how different the 
general perception of (major) shareholders was amongst Japanese 
company directors and employees, from the received Anglo-
American notion of the shareholder as owner of the company. 
Shareholders had never been perceived to enjoy any particular 
ownership rights in the companies in which they were invested, so the 
relatively recently introduced idea that shareholders might be able to 
unilaterally influence company decisions seemed to be difficult to 
comprehend. 
 
In every company we studied, a distinction was made between what 
were termed ‘political’ or mochiai (cross-) shareholders and 
‘investment’ shareholders, but neither group appeared to be 
recognised as having any specific ownership rights in the firms in 
which they held shares. Investment shares tended to be viewed simply 
as that, investments with no other specific claims on the company. 
But even political shareholdings, resulting from the common practice 
of exchanging shares between business partners, were not perceived 
to confer any particular ownership rights on the holders of these 
shares. Instead they appeared to be seen simply as symbols of a close, 
mutually beneficial business relationship: 
 
They are not really shareholders. They want to understand the 
software or the hardware. They don’t really want finance 
information and so on. Shares only signify the good relationship 
between them and us. 
 
In practice, company directors controlled the allocation of equities, 
tending to select their majority shareholders on the basis of 
established business relationships. For example, the finance director 
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of one of the longest-established companies in the sample, 
acknowledged that many share deals continued to be carried out in 
closed sessions, rather than through the market: 
 
We have a finance directors [keiretsu] group meeting regularly, 
so we know the faces and can have conversations at these 
meetings. Sometimes I might sit here, and he will sit there, and I 
will have the need to make mochiai, so while we are chatting the 
deal is done. When they have a need to sell our stock they will 
come to us, discuss their situation, and we will consider their 
proposal. This might happen when their business results are 
extremely bad, and they have a lack of cash. 
 
This does not conform to the mainstream Anglo-American view of 
shareholders as corporate owners selecting managers as their agents. 
Indeed, shares allocated in this way did not appear to confer any sense 
of firm ownership at all, neither in the eyes of the company directors 
doing the allocating nor the shareholders to whom shares were 
allocated. This was true even for large Japanese institutional investors 
we interviewed: for example, employees at a major Japanese life 
insurance company acknowledged that the reason the organisation 
bought equities in companies was as much to cement sales with client 
companies and their employees, as it was to achieve returns on the 
equity investments.  
 
Rather than being associated with a hierarchical owner/agent 
relationship, the practice of exchanging shares in this way was 
discussed as entailing a balance of power between the parties. It 
seemed that by eschewing an ownership type of relationship, 
shareholders and companies were able to enter into a far more trusting 
and productive association than would otherwise have been the case. 
For example, the president of one company explained that the 
relatively equal relationship with one particular bank with which his 
company had exchanged shares, guaranteed reciprocal trust that was 
uncomplicated by the potential of one partner exercising undue 
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influence over the other because of specific rights or claims 
associated with the notion of ownership: 
 
The advantage is that whenever I face a problem I can 
personally ask them [the main bank] to help me, and I am 
positive [emphatically] that they will help me. And also they 
have a lot of knowledge about M&A and so on, so I can always 
call them to help me. I want confidentiality, but I don’t always 
want an agreement or contract with them. There is no liability 
there; there is always I owned you or you owned me, always 
there is that kind of relationship, but with [bank name] we don’t 
have any of that. 
 
This interviewee, like many others, spoke of ownership in negative 
terms, implying that as an unequal power relationship it would 
constrain rather than enhance the quality of communication between 
partners. Without the hierarchical type of relationship implicit in the 
notion that shareholders were owners of the company, it appeared that 
company directors felt extremely comfortable communicating and 
liasing with their major equity holders. For example the finance 
director of one company, not part of a recognised business group, told 
us:  
 
Every month, not me but one of the directors visits [our biggest 
shareholder] and explains what has happened that month and the 
monthly results, and listens to their comments. He visits the 
president, the chairman and the executive vice presidents so that 
all of them have the opportunity to ask questions. This is the 
Japanese way of communicating. As for [the second biggest 
shareholder, a life insurance company] and other institutions I 
myself visit twice a year, because in this country we don’t have 
quarterly reporting, so we explain and invite questions from 
them, and normally not only the person in charge of the 
relationship but the president and several key executives will 
attend. 
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This kind of willing and open communication contrasted strongly 
with reported encounters between some of the Japanese companies 
studied and foreign institutional investors who, at the time of the 
research, had begun to make official visits to companies in which they 
had invested asserting what they saw as their rights as owners. Such 
visits were viewed with enormous suspicion; for example, the 
manager of a trust bank talked about the complete bewilderment of 
one of his clients when a non-Japanese institutional investor first 
made contact with the company in the mid 1990s: 
 
For example four or five years ago no-one knew about [US 
pension fund] - they first saw the letters sent by [US pension 
fund] to the companies and they thought it was another sokaiya 
[corporate extortionist]. Honestly. They thought they were 
racketeers trying to get money out of Japanese companies. 
 
Such reactions seemed to confirm the importance in Japan of acting in 
a relationship in ways that precluded one or other partner from being 
perceived as taking advantage of a powerful position. By 
acknowledging and being sensitive to the balance of power in the 
relationship, each party was able to act in ways that nurture and are in 
the best interests of the long-term relationship. In this respect, 
frequent references to the balance of power in relationships, and the 
generally unenthusiastic attitude to the notion of shareholders as 
owners, appeared to be associated with a sensitivity to the potential 
dangers of abusing a powerful position which comes with any 
hierarchically based association.  
 
The idea that shareholders are not perceived to be, in any practical 
sense, owners of Japanese companies is not a novel finding. 
Economic historians have long argued that the nature of 
corporatisation in Japan following the Meiji Restoration strongly 
contributed to the emasculation of shareholders and the associated 
genesis of stable interlocking shareholding (Fruin 1992; Yamamura 
1997). It is argued that the pre-existence of household forms of 
organisation, rapid economic change, the need to adopt foreign 
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technology quickly and the relative scarcity of capital during the late 
nineteenth century, compelled the majority of companies to specialise, 
and precluded diversification or rapid expansion. However, as some 
companies began to establish nationwide rather than local or regional 
business, they realised the need to create economies of scale and 
scope. Rather than developing vertically or horizontally integrated 
companies, networks of closely or loosely allied groups of companies, 
which are commonly known as keiretsu, were established. Partly to 
raise capital and partly to cement business relationships, shares were 
often sold to friendly companies and institutions, rather than on the 
open market. Masaki (1979) reports the explicit advice of Mitsubishi 
Bank and Mitsubishi Mining in offering stocks for the first time in 
1928 as an example of the type of understandings that commonly 
accompanied such share exchanges: 
 
Since these stocks are offered for a long-term investment, such 
action as immediately selling them should be abstained from in 
the light of moral obligation to the company. If it is necessary, 
however, to sell them, inform the head office beforehand so that 
we can buy them back at the selling price. (p. 46)  
 
Okazaki (1994) suggests that the 1940s wartime planned economy 
also strongly influenced /re-inforced this attitude to shareholders. At 
this time, the government felt that the stabilisation of manager-worker 
relations needed to be prioritised in order to contribute to the war 
effort, so efforts were made explicitly to attenuate the power and 
authority of shareholders vis-à-vis companies. For example, the 
Japanese Cabinet on 7 December 1940 passed an Act entitled ‘The 
Outline of the Establishment of a New Economic System’ which 
viewed shareholders, managers and employees as equal participants in 
the firm, and had the effect of strengthening the role of managers, and 
re-focused firms away from a simple pursuit of profit (Okazaki 1994).  
 
What our interviews suggest, is that in spite of the myriad changes 
taking place within Japanese industry, this notion that shareholding 
entailed participation and partnership in the firm, rather than 
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ownership of the firm, was not changing significantly. The idea that 
by virtue of owning shares in a company, you thereby were granted 
some form of ‘ownership’ rights in the firm, continued to be (in the 
eyes of both company employees and shareholders alike) difficult to 
understand.  
 
Acting as an owner 
In all of the companies we studied that had been established since 
1945, founding families rather than shareholders were frequently 
referred to as ‘owners’, even when they did not hold a majority 
shareholding. Furthermore, founding families were often considered 
to be owners of many of the long-established companies we studied, 
even where they held insignificant proportions of the issued shares. 
For example, in one company we were told by one of the directors: 
 
[...] here the influence of the founding family is still great. Here, 
where the [name] family ownership is only 10% or so, still they 
act as owners. 
 
In another large, listed company, the current president was a 
descendant of the founder, in spite of his family having no significant 
shareholding in the company at all. One employee at the company 
claimed: 
 
[Company name] really belongs to the [name] group, and 
although it is a listed company it is owned by the [name] family, 
even though they do not have a significant shareholding. 
 
Even in the cases where there was no continuing involvement of a 
founding family in the affairs of a particular company, its ownership 
was often likened to, or discussed in terms of, a family. One of the 
principal implications here seemed to be that, like a family, it is 
difficult to talk meaningfully of an individual or specific group 
‘owning’ the firm. This is because the firm is perceived primarily to 
constitute a social institution, not a contrived agglomeration of inputs, 
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assets and outputs. This view of the firm was reflected in almost all 
company practices. For example, there were invariably long 
inductions into the company for new employees, where socialisation 
and acculturation were consistently given higher priority than 
introductions to operational issues. Salaries in the majority of 
companies were not designed to provide a gradually increasing 
income over time, but a wage appropriate to an employee’s stage of 
life (the rate of increase in salaries tends to accelerate for employees 
in their late twenties, when they are likely to begin a family, and 
decelerates in the early 50s when it is assumed that family expenses 
are reduced). It was also the case that in many companies, 
accommodation was provided for employees, again appropriate to the 
stage of life which an employee had reached: for younger employees 
this might be a dormitory, while for older employees with children 
this would be a family apartment. Given the importance attached to 
the socialisation of employees into the corporate community, the 
Japanese term ‘sha-in’, or ‘member of the company’, seemed to be a 
more accurate label than ‘employee’. One sha-in who had been with 
his company for about 15 years maintained: 
 
Once you are employed by a company you can experience 
several jobs within the company through internal rotation, and 
as you learn more you feel more relaxed and happy with the life 
you are given by the company, and you concentrate more on 
building a career within the company without thinking about 
outside the company. This comfort makes us feel very happy 
and that we are protected by the company in our day-to-day life, 
and within that framework you can plan your life.  
 
This, and many other similar comments, suggests a recognition 
amongst employees that over time, their own personal interests and 
status are increasingly bound up with the interests and status of the 
company itself, to the extent that their own lives become inextricably 
interlinked with those of their colleagues and the company as a whole. 
One employee made plain the extent to which he felt his future was 
bound up with that of his company: 
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[...] do you know the term ‘corporate citizen’? The company 
invests in us, and this means that the company is financing us, 
like a school. So I think we have to give back something to the 
company. All workers are incorporated into the company and 
have a sense of being a citizen of the company. 
 
In these respects, it seems that conceiving of the firm as a bundle of 
assets that can be broken down into component parts and bought and 
sold easily, was very difficult for those who were part of this system 
to comprehend. ‘Ownership’ of the firm, has as a consequence, very 
different meanings than the Anglo-American idea which is generally 
associated with a bundle of enforceable rights and claims in relation 
to the company. Instead, ‘ownership’ of the firm seems to imply being 
responsible for the actions of one’s company as a whole, a 
responsibility that is shared with one’s colleagues. As a consequence, 
for employees in the majority of companies we studied, ownership of 
the firm seemed to be bound up with a strong sense of joint and 
several responsibility for the company, which resulted from the strong 
sense of identification with and commitment to the company and 
one’s colleagues. One employee summed up succinctly what 
‘ownership’ of the firm meant for him in this sense of the word:  
 
We employees think that we are the owners. When I am doing a 
job I sometimes think what is best for our company, not just for 
myself - I tend not to work just for our official responsibility, 
but acting as if I am the president or chairman. This is the strong 
point of Japanese company. 
 
Concluding Reflections 
In the above we have sought to illuminate and disturb taken for 
granted notions of the ownership of the corporation, through drawing 
upon two pieces of qualitative empirical research which both offer 
perspectives on ownership amongst corporate practitioners 
themselves. The Denton case, precisely because it contains some 
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rather anachronistic views of ownership, makes it possible to see that 
the meaning of ownership is contextually and historically contingent. 
In so far as it offers sight of an earlier version of UK corporate 
ownership, it suggests how thin and impoverished is our current view 
of ownership of the firm. Family ownership ties you to a specific 
company where the rights to dividends are inseparable from a set of 
felt responsibilities, to past and future members of the family as well 
as to those who consume and produce the product.  
 
A similar relational specificity characterises the reported Japanese 
understanding of shareholding. Shareholding is expressive of 
relational bonds, and comes to be embodied and enacted through 
particular face to face relationships. Shareholding does not carry with 
it a set of exclusive rights – of control, or disposal - but rather is an 
explicit acknowledgement of reciprocal dependence and obligation 
built up in the course of business relationships. As in Denton, the sale 
of shares for personal gain is felt as a betrayal of these obligations. 
Instead, the rights of shareholders are inseparable from strongly felt 
senses of responsibility. In Denton this responsibility is part of a 
paternalistic view of ownership; the benefits of exclusive rights to 
wealth, control and status bring especial responsibilities. In the 
Japanese case material, whilst there are vestiges of such family based 
paternalism, reciprocal responsibilities and obligation seemingly 
accrue without any necessary reference to ‘ownership’ in a 
contemporary western sense. Instead, a deep identification with the 
‘company’ as social institution, both by self and others, is the basis 
for a more inclusive sense of ‘ownership’; ownership as belonging, 
standing in for, representing in one’s person, bearing the obligations.  
 
What both cases suggest is that ownership can only be thought of as a 
relational concept rather than as a property that inheres somehow 
within the individual. Part of the problem of an exclusive version of 
ownership, as with any designation of identity, is that it tacitly 
depends upon and creates what it is not. So the owner in this 
exclusive sense creates and requires the non-owner manager who 
must then be feared precisely because he is not one of us; because 
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s/he might behave as an owner rather than the agent that you wish him 
to be. Marx was right therefore to observe the antagonism inherent in 
the private ownership of socialised means of production. Interestingly, 
if a relational view of ownership is insisted upon, the rights claimed 
as owner cannot be readily divorced from the responsibilities to others 
that are implied; instead such a divorce has itself to be socially 
contrived through the depersonalising and decontextualising – 
alienating - mechanisms of the market. Distance avoids the 
discomfort of guilt.  
 
Ownership is this regard can be seen as an attempt to enact a fantasy 
of omnipotence which denies or reverses the actual dependencies in 
which a person is embedded. So the demand that the agent should 
enact the will of the principal, contains a denial of the limitations – 
skill, knowledge, body – of the owner as well as a refusal to 
acknowledge the owner’s need of others. It is this fantasy of 
omnipotence rather than the divorce of ownership and control that is 
arguably the source of governance problems. So in Denton, the 
interests of the owner/managers were only aligned whilst the firm did 
well. A decline in performance set executive owners against each 
other as well as against the other shareholders. The problem of 
governance as an excess of autonomy predated the separation of 
ownership and control. Similarly, the early attempts at separating 
ownership and control led to an impossible struggle for dominance 
between different family executives and executives only because each 
seemed to believe that such control could be made absolute; that 
others could and should be but a mirror of my will.  
 
It is essential to distinguish between control as an intention and its 
social outcomes; as Giddens (1984) rightly insists control in terms of 
outcomes always has the form of a ‘dialectic’ in which there is 
autonomy and dependence in both directions. And, indeed, the 
separation of ownership and control at Denton was only effected 
through a process of differentiation, that realised control through a 
retreat from the attempt at direct family control; through an 
acknowledgment of autonomy and dependence in both directions 
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between the family owners and managers. Governance here, although 
defined as a right of ownership, can be seen to have depended for its 
success on the skilful development of processes of accountability both 
within and between the board and shareholder council. Such 
accountability – the giving and demanding of reasons for conduct - is 
precisely what an exclusive definition of ownership refuses, and what 
it risks socially – that an individual or group becomes a law unto 
themselves (Roberts 2001). The solution to the governance problem is 
therefore not necessarily bound to means whereby the rights of 
ownership can be reasserted or captured by others but rather depends 
upon preventing the fantasy of omnipotence from taking root. 
 
In this respect the Japanese case material is highly instructive. 
Whereas in Anglo-American governance systems we play upon the 
fear and greed of the ‘individual’ to secure the different interests of 
the corporation and its shareholders, in Japan security is sought 
through protecting the relational bond rather than the self. The result 
is a system in which there is a relatively low incidence of individual 
sanctions or rewards, but precisely because of this, no limit to the 
possibility for identification with the corporation and the interests it 
contains. Interests are aligned through creating no opportunity to 
effectively differentiate out a set of interests that are exclusively mine. 
Paradoxically, as the final case quote suggests, this captures all the 
motivational benefits of ownership for a broad group of staff – they 
think and act as if the company were theirs – with none of the 
paranoia that haunts exclusive forms of ownership. 
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